Estimating Impacts of Regional Policies: A Review of Applied Research Methods by Bartels, C.P.A. et al.
Estimating Impacts of Regional 
Policies: A Review of Applied 
Research Methods
Bartels, C.P.A., Nicol, W.R. and Duijn, J.J. van
IIASA Working Paper
WP-81-059
May 1981 
Bartels, C.P.A., Nicol, W.R. and Duijn, J.J. van (1981) Estimating Impacts of Regional Policies: A Review of Applied 
Research Methods. IIASA Working Paper. WP-81-059 Copyright © 1981 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/1702/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
NOT FOR QUOTATION 
WITHOUT PEFMISSION 
O F  THE AUTHOR 
ESTIMATING IMPACTS OF REGIONAL P O L I C I E S :  
A  REVIEW OF APPLIED RESEARCH METHODS 
C o r n e l i s  P.A.  B a r t e l s  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  A p p l i e d  
S y s t e m s  A n a l y s i s ,  L a x e n b u r g ,  A u s t r i a  
W i l l i a m  R. N i c o l  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  o f  
Management,  B e r l i n ,  FRG 
Jaap J. van D u i j n  
G r a d u a t e  SchooZ o f  Management,  
De Zf t ,  t h e  ' V e t h e r l a n d s  
May 1 9 8 1  
WP-81-59 
Working Paper s  are  i n t e r i m  repor t s  on w o r k  of t h e  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  A p p l i e d  S y s t e m s  A n a l y s i s  
and have received o n l y  l i m i t e d  r e v i e w .  V i e w s  o r  
o p i n i o n s  expressed h e r e i n  do n o t  necessari ly repre- 
s e n t  those  of t h e  I n s t i t u t e  o r  of i t s  N a t i o n a l  M e m b e r  
O r g a n i z a t i o n s .  
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
A - 2 3 6 1  L a x e n b u r g ,  A u s t r i a  
FOREWORD 
Sharp ly  reduced r a t e s  of  popu l a t i on  and i n d u s t r i a l  growth 
have been p r o j e c t e d  f o r  many of t h e  developed n a t i o n s  i n  t h e  
1980s. I n  economies t h a t  r e l y  p r i m a r i l y  on market  mechanisms 
t o  r e d i r e c t  c a p i t a l  and l a b o r  from s u r p l u s  t o  d e f i c i t  a r e a s ,  
t h e  problems o f  ad ju s tmen t  may be slow and s o c i a l l y  c o s t l y .  I n  
t h e  more c e n t r a l i z e d  economies,  i n c r e a s i n g  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  
d e t e rmin ing  inves tment  a l l o c a t i o n s  and i nduc ing  s e c t o r a l  r e d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n s  of a  n e a r l y  c o n s t a n t  o r  d imin i sh ing  l a b o r  f o r c e  may 
a r i s e .  The socioeconomic problems t h a t  f low from such changes  
i n  l a b o r  demands and s u p p l i e s  form t h e  c o n t e x t u a l  background 
o f  t h e  Manpower Ana ly s i s  Task,  which i s  s t r i v i n g  t o  deve lop  
methods f o r  ana lyz ing  and p r o j e c t i n g  t h e  impac t s  o f  i n t e r n a -  
t i o n a l ,  n a t i o n a l ,  and r e g i o n a l  p o p u l a t i o n  dynamics on l a b o r  
sup p ly ,  demand, and p r o d u c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  more-developed n a t i o n s .  
A s  p a r t  o f  t h e  p o l i c y - o r i e n t e d  r e s e a r c h  conducted  w i t h i n  
t h e  Manpower Ana ly s i s  Task, t h i s  paper  g i v e s  a  c a r e f u l ,  c r i t i ca l  
review of  d i f f e r e n t  methods t h a t  have been used t o  a s s e s s  e f f e c t s  
o f  p o l i c i e s  focused on r e g i o n a l  l a b o r  markets .  Fol lowing an  
e x t e n s i v e  review o f  d i f f e r e n t  approaches  used i n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  
f i e l d  o f  p o l i c y  e v a l u a t i o n ,  t h e  a u t h o r s  s u g g e s t  p o i n t s  o f  
d e p a r t u r e  f o r  f u t u r e  r e s e a r c h  on t h e  impacts  of government i n t e r -  
v e n t i o n  on l a b o r  market  developments.  
Andrei  Rogers 
Chairman 
Human S e t t l e m e n t s  
and S e r v i c e s  Area 
ABSTRACT 
This paper gives a review of research methods that have 
been used to estimate the impacts of regional policies. A 
distinction is made between microstudies and macrostudies, and 
the pros and cons of different approaches within each of these 
groups are extensively discussed. The paper concludes with 
some suggestions for future research in this field. 
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ESTIMATING IMPACTS OF REGIONAL POLICIES: 
A REVIEW OF APPLIED RESEARCH METHODS 
1 .  INTRODUCTION 
Eight  yea r s  ago t h e r e  was a  severe  complaint  from t h e  
Expenditure Committee of t h e  B r i t i s h  House of Commons: 
There must be few a r e a s  of government expendi ture  i n  
which so much i s  spen t  bu t  so  l i t t l e  known about  t h e  
success  of po l i cy .  The most our  wi tness  could say was 
t h a t . .  . t h e  s i t u a t i o n  was b e t t e r  than  it would have been 
wi thout  t h e  i n c e n t i v e s  and c o n t r o l s  of some s o r t  of 
r e g i o n a l  po l i cy .  Yet no one could say  whether t h i s  
e f f e c t  was a  major o r  a  minor one. (House of  Comons 
Expenditure Committe 1973-74:para.116) 
Around t h e  same t ime,  Coleman wrote i n  a  more gene ra l  
sense : 
... t h e r e  i s  no body of methods, no comprehensive method- 
ology,  f o r  t h e  s tudy of t h e  impact of p u b l i c  po l i cy  ... 
(Coleman, 1975:19) 
Today, t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t .  I n  s e v e r a l  
c o u n t r i e s  a  cons ide rab le  amount of r e sea rch  has  been c a r r i e d  out  
t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  p o s s i b l e  impacts of r e g i o n a l  p o l i c i e s .  Dif- 
f e r e n t  types  of methodological  approaches have been used f o r  
t h i s  purpose. A s  a  r e s u l t ,  q u a n t i t a t i v e  e s t i m a t e s  of s e v e r a l  
k inds  of  impacts of r e g i o n a l  po l i cy  ins t ruments  have been 
obta ined .  There have even been a t tempts  t o  p r e s e n t  a  more o r  
l e s s  comprehensive assessment  of a l l  k inds  of  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s ,  
r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of complete r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y  
programs. 
The l a s t  decade has  t h u s  been c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by r a t h e r  a c t i v e ,  
t r a d i t i o n a l ,  and i n n o v a t i v e  r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y  r e sea rch .  A f t e r  such 
i n t e n s i v e  a c t i v i t y  it now seems worthwhile t o  l e a n  back f o r  a 
whi l e  and a s s e s s  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  of a l l  t h e s e  assessment  
a c t i v i t i e s .  There have been o t h e r  r e c e n t  surveys  i n  t h i s  f i e l d ,  
b u t  t h e s e  have been l e s s  comprehensive focus ing  mainly on 
B r i t i s h  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  (compare Ashcrof t ,  1979; Marquand, 1980; 
and Schof i e ld ,  1979; comparative s t u d i e s  which cove r  s e v e r a l  
European c o u n t r i e s  a r e  Ashcrof t ,  1980; Nico l ,  1980, and Vanhove 
and Klaassen,  1980) .  Another d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  t h a t  w e  want t o  
focus  on t h e  p ros  and cons of t h e  r e s u l t s  ob ta ined .  (Other  
u s e f u l  r e f e r e n c e s  d i s c u s s i n g  s i m i l a r  i s s u e s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  f i e l d s  
of p o l i c y  making a r e  ~ { b l e r ,  1980 and Lund, 1976).  Th i s  may 
enab le  u s  t o  i d e n t i f y  on t h e  one hand weak p o i n t s  t h a t  should  
be prevented  i n  f u t u r e  r e s e a r c h ,  and on t h e  o t h e r  hand promising 
approaches t h a t  cou ld  y i e l d  f r u i t f u l  new a p p l i c a n t s .  Fu r the r -  
more, w e  want t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  i f  t h e  r e s e a r c h  methodology i s  a t  
a l l  sound enough t o  produce r e l i a b l e  conc lus ions  about  t h e  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  impacts  of  p o l i c y  a c t i o n s .  
S ince  o u r  concern w i l l  be  s o  much wi th  methods, t h e  r e a d e r  
w i l l  n o t  f i n d  an enumeration of a l l  r e l e v a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and a 
survey of t h e i r  main r e s u l t s .  Such in fo rma t ion  can be  be t t e r .  
found i n  t h e  r e f e r e n c e s  mentioned above, wh i l e  i n  a d d i t i o n  t h e  
b ib l iog raphy  i n  Al len  (1978) p r e s e n t s  a good e n t r y  t o  r e l e v a n t  
r e s e a r c h  i n  s e v e r a l  European c o u n t r i e s .  I n  o u r  d i s c u s s i o n  w e  
s h a l l  s c a r c e l y  r e f e r  t o  c e r t a i n  a p p l i c a t i o n s  a s  t y p i c a l  examples 
of c e r t a i n  r e s e a r c h  approaches.  
There a r e  many ways i n  which government may a f f e c t  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  i n  r eg ions ,  which may ask  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  of  
e v a l u a t i o n  techniques .  I n  t h i s  paper  w e  l i m i t  o u r s e l v e s  t o  o n l y  
p a r t  of t h e s e  government i n t e r v e n t i o n s .  F i r s t ,  w e  o n l y  c o n s i d e r  
t hose  government a c t i v i t i e s  aimed a t  d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  
r e g i o n a l  economic s i t u a t i o n .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  w e  s h a l l  n o t  
d e a l  w i t h  noneconomic r e g i o n a l  p o l i c i e s  ( s u c h  a s  hous ing ,  
e d u c a t i o n ,  and w e l f a r e )  and n o t  w i t h  n a t i o n a l  p o l i c i e s  which 
may have a  r e g i o n a l l y  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  impac t .  Second, a c t i v i t i e s  
of  national governments  a r e  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  
s t u d i e s  reviewed h e r e .  S p e c i f i c  a c t i o n s  of  l o c a l  and r e g i o n a l  
governments  ( e . g . ,  i n  l a n d  u s e  and t r a n s p o r t  p l a n n i n g )  a r e  
beyond t h e  scope  o f  t h i s  paper .  
I n  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  t o  f o l l o w  w e  s h a l l  f i r s t  d e a l  w i t h  some 
r e l e v a n t  n o t i o n s  and t o p i c s  which re la te  mainly  t o  p o l i c y  
e v a l u a t i o n  i n  g e n e r a l .  A f t e r  t h e s e  i n t r o d u c t o r y  remarks ,  w e  
t u r n  t o  a more s p e c i f i c  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  methods t h a t  
have been used f o r  t h e  e s t i m a t i o n  o f  i m p a c t s  o f  r e g i o n a l  
p o l i c i e s .  
2 .  SOME GENERAL NOTIONS OF POLICY EVALUATION 
The purpose  o f  p o l i c y  e v a l u a t i o n  i s  t o  a c q u i r e  i n s i g h t  
i n t o  t h e  consequences  t h a t  a r e  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  c e r t a i n  p o l i c i e s .  
Such consequence  can  be i n t e n d e d  o r  n o t  i n t e n d e d  by t h e  d e s i g n e r s  
o f  p o l i c y  programs;  which consequences  a r e  i n v e s t i g a t e d  depends  
upon t h e  s p e c i f i c  p e r s p e c t i v e s  chosen.  The impac t s  of  r e g i o n a l  
economic p o l i c y  may be e v a l u a t e d  from a t  l eas t  t h r e e  s e p a r a t e  
p e r s p e c t i v e s  (see a l s o  Haveman, 1976 and S c h o f i e l d ,  1979) :  
f i r s t ,  i t s  impact  on t h e  r e g i o n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  g o a l  v a r i a b l e s  
such as economic w e l f a r e ,  economic a c t i v i t i e s ,  and l a b o r  marke t  
d i s c r e p a n c i e s ;  second,  i t s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  g o a l  v a r i a b l e s  o f  
n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y ,  l i k e  n a t i o n a l  o u t p u t  and f u l l  employment; and 
t h i r d ,  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  impact  on t h e  N a t i o n a l  T r e a s u r y  which i s  o f  
s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  t o  p o l i c y  makers who have t o  choose  among a l t e r -  
n a t i v e  u s e s  o f  s c a r c e  r e s o u r c e s .  I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  rev iew i t  w i l l  
appear  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  p e r s p e c t i v e  h a s  been t h e  most f r e q u e n t l y  
used by p o l i c y  e v a l u a t o r s  i n  t h i s  f i e l d .  I t  w i l l  be c l e a r  t h a t  
t h e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  a  c e r t a i n  p e r s p e c t i v e  i s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  f i r s t  s t e p  
i n  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e ,  s i n c e  t h i s  s e l e c t i o n  d e t e r m i n e s  t h e  
v a r i a b l e s  on which p o l i c y  a s s e s s m e n t  w i l l  f o c u s  ( t h e  impact  
v a r i a b l e s  o r  outcome v a r i a b l e s ) .  
Insight into consequences, which can be attributed to cer- 
tain policy instruments, requires an estimation of the situation 
which would have existed in the absence of these instruments: 
the policy-off or counterfactual situation. It can be defended 
that such insight can never be obtained in a reliable way and 
that therefore a more modest approach is required which focuses on 
impact estimates of marginal changes in the application of policy 
instruments. But even the estimation of such marginal effects is 
not an easy matter. It requires insight into the process that 
links the instrument variables with the ultimate policy-goal 
variables; this process is, in general, a very complicated 
one. It may contain an easily detectable direct relationship 
between instrument and impact variables, but at the same time less 
perceptible interrelationships via other intervening variables. 
Hence, not only direct, primary impacts but also indirect impacts 
have to be identified. 
The difficulties involved in such an identification may be 
illustrated with an example. Suppose one is interested in the 
impacts of regional investment incentives on the level of employ- 
ment in the different regions. What sorts of direct and indirect 
impacts are to be expected in this case? Partly following Ohlsson 
(1979) we can first mention several ways in which the employment 
situation in a certain region may be positively affected: 
- a supported investment project may imply the creation of 
additional jobs--a primary and direct effect; 
- the increased activity of supported plants may cause an 
increased regional demand for intermediate goods, with 
possibly a related expansion of jobs--an indirect, intra- 
regional effect; 
- a similar effect may occur if more intermediate goods are 
delivered to supported plants in other regions--an 
indirect, interregional effect; 
- the extension of employment opportunites may lead to an 
increase in household income and subsequently to extra 
induced demand for regional goods and services with 
possibly related employment effects--an induced house- 
hold consumption effect; 
- the enlarged size of economic activity in the region may 
form an attractive location factor for additional new 
activities, which creates other indirect (multiplier) 
effects. 
However, there are also a number of possible negative impacts 
which may occur: 
- investment subsidies may stimulate the use of 
advanced labor saving techniques or a concentration on 
capital intensive products with possibly a net loss of 
jobs in the supported plant--a substitution effect; 
- support to certain firms may create. worse perspectives 
for their competitors--this competition effect may cause 
job losses in the same region or elsewhere; 
- negative competition effects may be amplified, because 
of reduced demands for intermediate goods and for con- 
sumption goods--indirect and induced effects, which may 
be intra- or interregional; 
- if the supply of certain production resources is region- 
ally limited, the expansion of regional economic activity 
may cause increased competition on factor markets with 
possibly negative impacts on regional employment. 
If the still more interesting question of how investment incen- 
tives affect the discrepancies in regional labor markets is 
posed, additional effects have to be included relating to the 
supply side of the labor market. Given that it is (registered) 
unemployment which figures highly in the mind of policy makers 
yet a very effective incentive policy can be consistent with 
little improvement in the regional unemployment situation. 
Since the additional demand for labor may have a number of 
supply side effects such as increasing the participation rate 
(i.e., reducing hidden unemployment), reducing "forced" out- 
migration, and stimulating inmigration of workers. 
This impression of the possible impacts of certain policy 
measure also makes it clear how important it is to indicate 
explicitly the t ime  p e r s p e c t i v e  one has in mind when estimating 
effects. Some consequences of policy will be observable more or 
less instantly, while with respect to others there may be 
considerable time lags between policy stimulus and response. The 
picture of total effects may therefore differ substantially 
between a short-run and a long-run analysis. 
The complexity that can be expected in the search for policy 
impacts makes it very understandable that most evaluators decided 
to limit themselves to the analysis of certain impacts on specific 
variables. Such analysis can of course only result in a partial 
assessment of policy impacts. With respect to the point of time at 
which a certain policy is implemented, such assessments have been 
undertaken: 
- either before implementation of the policy--that is, 
e x  a n t e  evaluation of possible impacts of a program, 
assuming, among other things, that there are no changes 
in uncontrolled exogenous variables and that ideas on the 
working of the economic system are correct; 
- or during or after the program implementation--that is, 
e x  p o s t  evaluation, which may be a summative evaluation 
of impacts when the program is completely finished or a 
formative evaluation when the program is being implemented 
in order to produce feedback for better implementation 
(see also Poister, 1978). 
Reliable e x  a n t e  evaluation requires good insight into the working 
of the economic system, including the role played by government 
intervention. Thus e x  p o s t  evaluations are frequently a necessary 
first step for gaining insight to make an e x  a n t e  assessment 
possible. Most of our discussion will therefore relate to 
problems arising in e x  p o s t  evaluation. 
A special problem in such an e x  p o s t  evaiuation arises from 
the measurement of the relevant variables. It is especially cumber- 
some to obtain meaningful operational indicators of the intensity 
of use of the various policy instruments. The kind of difficul- 
ties one frequently encounters may be illustrated with some 
examples. Some studies have attempted to estimate impacts of total 
government expenditures for regions. Yet, reliable estimates of 
the spatial allocation of the national budget are in most cases 
not available, while the availability of such figures still 
would not reveal where impacts could be expected because of all 
kinds of spatial spillovers (compare Vernez, 1980). Another 
example relates to economic infrastructure. Public investment 
in such infrastructure has been used in many countries as one of 
the most important instruments of regional economic policy. The 
spatial dispersion of government activity in this field is not 
revealed by public infrastructural programs for assisted areas, 
since all types of infrastructural investments are also under- 
taken in other regions, not under the heading of "regional policy". 
An indication of policy intensity thus requires a very careful 
examination of different parts of the national budget. A third 
example relates to another very important policy instrument: 
investment incentives. Such incentives have been used in many 
different forms (compare Allen et al., 1979, for an informative 
discussion). Some of these incentives are, however, not known 
at all, e.g., when they form part of package deals with large 
firms. (In the Netherlands special prices for the supply of 
energy have been treated as top secret in the past.) For other 
incentives their intensity is difficult to determine since this 
frequently depends very much on certain characteristics of the 
firm or the project. This is especially the case with incentives 
which are not automatically but discretionarily awarded (e.g., 
the Selective Financial Assistance in Britain). 
It is not only the measurement of the instrument variables 
that may be cumbersome, however. Also the information on the 
impact variables may be rather poor in practice. Complete and 
reliable information on variables like regional investment and 
employment is frequently not available (e.g., many studies 
estimate employment by counting the numbers of persons employed, 
without any adjustment for the fact that average working time is 
different among regions and time periods). Official figures on 
the incidence of unemployment often reveal only part of the 
existing job shortages, because of the existence of hidden 
unemployment . 
From the previous discussion, it can be concluded that 
before any quantitative ex post assessment of policy is made, 
a careful execution of a number of important preparatory steps 
is required. These include: 
1. Selection of the policy instruments and the variables 
on which impacts will be assessed. 
2. A careful qualitative analysis of the working of the in- 
struments, such as the conditions for their application, 
the a priori expected incidence at the micro level, etc. 
3. The development of a theoretical-qualitative framework 
which indicates the crucial linkages between instrument 
and impact variables, including direct and indirect 
effects within a certain time perspective. 
4. Selection of those impacts that are expected to be 
revealed by the chosen research method, and an 
indication of the effects that are excluded from the 
assessment and their possible importance. 
5. Selection of quantitative indicators for the variables 
included in the analysis, and an a priori evaluation of 
possible effects caused by the incomplete mapping 
between variables and indicators. 
6. Collection of the required data, with again a careful 
analysis of their shortcomings and possible consequences 
of these for the ultimate results. 
In the remainder of this paper we shall restrict ourselves 
to a further discussion of the fourth step: the choice of the 
research method and its implications for the results. In the 
next section we shall first make some general remarks on this 
point, which may provide a framework against which the attractive- 
ness of alternative research designs discussed later in this paper 
can be judged. 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND THE VALIDITY OF THE RESULTS 
The choice of a certain research design has important 
implications for the validity of the results to be obtained. 
First, any reliable evaluation study will attempt to make it 
plausible that an observed association between instrument and 
impact variables is indeed a causal one, and not that some 
factor other than the policy instrument has caused the observed 
a impact. This is commonly referred to as the i n t e r n a l  v a l i d i t y  
of the results. Second, in some cases one would like to use the 
results for deriving recommendations for policy making in different 
settings. In this case it has to be certain that the research 
findings can indeed be extended to other settings, and that they 
are not completely specific for the investigated case. This is 
called the e x t e r n a l  v a l i d i t y  of the results. Both types of 
validity are in practice threatened in many ways, and the choice 
of an appropriate research design will be governed by the desire 
to minimize certain "threats to validity." Following Poister 
(1978) we can identify the most common threats to validity, that 
arise in many different evaluation studies. 
The internal validity of the results may be jeopardized by 
the following difficulties: 
1. The impact variables may also be influenced by other 
nonpolicy variables and by changes that occur in the 
behavior of the units to which policy is directed and 
that are independent of the policy taken. 
2. Random components in the measurement of instruments and 
outcomes and in the behavior of the micro units have to 
be separated from the more systematic relationships one 
is interested in. 
3. If impacts are measured by investigating outcomes for 
target and comparison groups, one is not always sure 
that the groups are fully equivalent in terms of all the 
factors that might have influenced the final outcomes. 
For example: attrition rates and patterns of maturation 
may differ; repeated testing of target groups may affect 
the measurement of their reaction. 
These difficulties all relate to the problem of how to obtain a 
reliable approximation of the policy-off situation, with which 
the policy-on situation may be compared. 
The external validity of the results may be threatened by 
the following difficulties: 
1. The specific situation in which a program is implemented, 
like the point in time, the location in space, and the 
newness of the program, frequently makes the outcomes 
not very well transferable to other situations. 
2. In many cases a mixture of policy instruments is imple- 
mented at once and produces the observed outcomes, while 
it may be difficult to find other situations in which 
precisely the same package can be implemented. 
3. The evaluation results may be affected by some kind of 
reaction or reponse of the units which have been tested 
or observed, which may not exist in other settings. 
(For example, respondents may have certain perceptions 
of the likely consequences of alternative outcomes of an 
evaluation.) 
4. The cases that are subject to evaluation will not always 
be representative for other cases to which the same 
instruments could be applied. For example, volunteer 
participants in a new experiment may be more motivated 
than participants in repeated applications of the program. 
The points illustrate what kind of problems have to be solved to 
derive reliable statements in ex ante policy evaluation studies, 
where transferability of results from past experiences to new 
situations is an important condition. 
TO circumvent all threats to validity is simply impossible 
in social sciences, where a complete understanding of all relevant 
processes is utopic. The choice of a certain research methodology 
is therefore directed towards the elimination of certain of these 
difficulties. A first possible research strategy is the setting 
up of a controlled experiment, which allows the researcher to have 
full control over the different influences on the outcomes. This 
may create good possibilities to avoid most of the threats to 
internal validity. However, such controlled experiments are sel- 
dom realizable in the field of regional policy. A second strategy 
is formed by quasiezperimental research. In this strategy, the 
researcher can manipulate the data collection procedures, so as to 
separate the impact of relevant situational (nonpolicy) variables 
from that of the policy instruments, using some kind of statistical 
technique. However, in using this approach, one is generally not 
sure that real causal effects have been identified: the internal 
validity of the results is often dubious. A third strategy is 
followed in studies which do not worry very much about separate 
policy and nonpolicy forces. Using a completely nonexperimental 
design the investigation is restricted to the simple observation 
of outcome variables, e.g., before and after policy implementation 
or among different noncomparable groups. This strategy can hardly 
be considered a serious attempt at policy evaluation, since the 
validity of the results will be threatened in all possible ways. 
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to a discussion 
of experimental, nonexperimental, and quasiexperimental evaluation 
research for regional policies. We shall subdivide the studies 
according to the level of aggregation of the utilized data. A 
first group is formed by microstudies, in which data collected 
for microunits are the basis for the impact assessment. A second 
group consists of macz20studies, which utilize aggregated data to 
discern policy impacts. 
4. MICROSTUDIES OF REGIONAL POLICY IMPACTS 
Microstudies directly investigate the behavior of units 
likely to be affected by a policy program. The data may be 
collected through direct observation, questionnaires, and inter- 
views. Several statistical techniques can be used to derive 
quantitative impact estimates. 
In principle, controZZed experimentation is possible at the 
micro level. Using completely equivalent treatment and control 
groups, one attempts to isolate the impact of treatment on the 
outcomes of the treated group, as compared with the behavior of 
the control groups. Measurement of the impacts is based on the 
observation of outcome variables for the treatment and control 
groups, before and after the policy implementation. To obtain 
equivalent control groups, matched samples are frequently used, 
in which pairs of individuals with similar characteristics for 
relevant independent variables are seiected. As stated before, 
this research strategy is in principle attractive to isolate 
causal relations between instrm-ents and outcomes, although it does 
not provide much insight into the precise channels through which 
such effects occur. Because of this advantage, c6ntrolled 
experiments have been used in many areas of policy evaluation, 
although with the exception of regional economic policy. Applica- 
tions can be found for welfare policies, educational policies, and. 
energy policies. An interesting application is a large scale 
experimental analysis of several impacts of housing policies in 
the USA, undertaken by the RAND Corporation. This experiment 
covers a rather long time period (10 years) so that long term 
effects can also be investigated (compare Rasmussen, 1980, for 
more details). 
Apart from the difficulty of transfering results to other 
situations, there are at least two problems with this method 
which may have prevented a wider use for regional policy evalu- 
ation: 
1. ~pplication of this method will reveal only those impacts 
that are experienced by the target group during the - 
period of experimentation. Impacts which occur later, 
or which are felt by other groups, will not be observed. 
Furthermore, if certain impacts were not expected a priori, 
the measurement method may fail to register them appro- 
priately. 
2 .  In many situations it will be impossible to find adequate 
control grouFa. This is particularly true for most 
regional policy instruments. First, participatiop in 
most programs is voluntary so that participants and 
nonparticipants constitute incomparable groups by 
definition. Second, the rules for participation 
contain restrictions on the geographical location, 
implying that control groups have to be sought in the 
same region, which will again be impossible. It has 
to be noted however, that this difficulty might be 
weakened if the policy evaluation were to have more 
influence on the policy implementation, so that some 
discrimination in application could be attained in 
order to obtain control groups. 
Since the second drawback could be avoided in certain policy 
programs, and since the first drawback may be less serious if we 
look for very specific impacts, the use of controlled experiments 
seems still to be an attractive strategy for the evaluation of 
certain policy instruments (i.e., those which can be implemented 
so that the evaluation has some control on the stimulus). 
Another, and more frequent use of microstudies for policy 
evaluation is in a non- or quasiexperimental setting. A non- 
experimental microstudy would use questionnaires or interviews 
to obtain information on the development of the impact variables 
at the microlevel after the implementation of a certain policy, 
without any serious attempt to control for nonpolicy influences. 
This approach may be quite valid, if the collection of essential 
information depends upon such surveys. For example, in Bartels 
and Wijma (1980) a survey among relocated government offices'was 
used to assess some of the direct impacts of relocation on the 
regions of destination. In Poolman and Wever (1978) it could be 
concluded from a survey of the assisted firms in a certain region 
that employment in these firms had developed less favorably than 
employment in the nonassisted firms, in a given time period. 
Neither of these examples makes a reliable estimation of direct 
and indirect policy impacts possible, but still both yield useful 
information for further evaluation attempts. In a quasiexperi- 
mental approach, however, more information is collected so that 
it may be attempted to identify separate influences on the impact 
variables. This can be operationalized by means of an ex post 
survey, with sufficient variation in the data to detect different 
influences; a panel study in which the sate units are surveyed 
before and after policy intervention; or a retrospective survey 
in which questions are asked about the situation before and 
after the policy intervention. 
Instrument variables may enter in two different ways in 
such surveys, The first possibility is that they are not 
explicitly incorporated, but act via certain intervening 
variables. These intervening variables are then directly 
influenced by the instruments and have a direct effect on the 
impact variable. There have been, for example, studies which 
used microdata to estimate the relation between personal 
disposable income and the amount of hours worked for members of 
the labor force. The income variable may be considered as an 
intervening variable for policy instruments such as income faxes, 
minimum wages, etc. Hence, the estimated relationship would 
allow an assessment of policy effects. (Certain drawbacks of 
the use of intervening variables for such purposes are discuss-ed 
below under the macrostudies.) A second possibility is to incor- 
porate the instrument variables explicitly in the questionnaire. 
For example, it is asked if the eligibility for a relocation 
subsidy has contributed to the decision to relocate. 
It has to be noted that most microstudies which provide 
insight into possible impacts of regional policies have not been 
initially concerned with assessment of policy impacts. Instead 
they focus more generally on identifying the forces and factors 
behind particular decisions, in particular, the decisions of 
private firms and individual households to move to another loca- 
tion. The information obtained by such surveys makes it also 
possible to comment on the role of policy. But the design of the 
studies, and the way in which the data have been examined, frequen- 
tly only allow conclusions on the r e l a t i v e  influence of policy as 
compared with other factors. Quantitative statements on policy 
impacts are then not easily derived, This is clear in studies 
of private firms focusing on their location and investment 
behavior and their performance at different locations, and in 
studies of location behavior of individual households. 
Although a quantitative assessment of policy impacts is 
seldom derived from these survey studies they still have provided 
very valuable insight which is indispensable for the analysis of 
policy impacts. We mention a number of useful contributions from 
these microstudies. (The remaining part of this section is based 
to an important extent on the discussion in Nicol and McKean, 
1980.) 
1. Microstudies yield information on the perception by 
individual decision makers of the importance of relevant factors 
influencing their decision. This at least provides some qualita- 
tive information on the possible roles of policy instruments, and 
also insight which may be useful for the design of macrostudies. 
As an example we mention studies of the location behavior of 
private firms. These have revealed, in countries like the 
Netherlands (see Bartels and van Duijn, 1981, for a summary) and 
West Germany (see Krist, 1980, for a summary), that the availa- 
bility of building sites, adequate labor supply, and good traffic 
conditions have been more important location factors than the 
possibility of obtaining investment incentives. However in 
Marquand (1980) British studies are discussed which place regional 
incentives in the second place, behind labor availability. 
2. Some of these studies have asked hypothetical questions, 
e.g.,"Would you have undertaken this investment project if no 
incentives had been available?" as an attempt to get some indica- 
tion of the counterfactual situation. Despite the .fact that he 
answers to such questions ?.re also hypothetical, they have been 
used to derive quantitative assessments of possible policy impacts. 
Interesting examples are Calame (1980), where results are pre- 
sented which have been derived from questions about wage subsidy 
programs in various countries; Beaumont (19791, where the impacts 
of migration incentives are investigated for labor migrants; 
Poolman and Wever (1978), where the impacts of investment incen- 
tives on the location decision of firms are considered; and 
Moore and Rhodes (1976a), where interviews are used to reveal 
various effects of a regional employment premium as perceived by 
senior executives in firms. 
3. The results may contribute to a better understanding of 
the decision process, which is important for the design of 
macrostudies. For example, it the movement of households or firms 
has to be studied with aggregate data, it is important to know 
whether the decision process which leads to a move can be broken 
down into two steps (first: decision to move; second: choice of 
destination) or is essentially an interdependent process. 
Several microstudies of the location behavior of firms have 
concluded that a two step procedure seems to be a good approxi- 
mation, in which the decision to move is not affected much by 
government incentives while the choice of the location may be 
more sensitive to policy instruments. But in countries with 
disincentive policies this separation seems artificial, since 
such policies obviously act to make investment, movement, and 
location decisions interdependent. 
4. Microstudies contain information that may be very help- 
ful in the measurement of the intensity of a certain policy 
instrument, since such measurement depends on how policy 
instruments enter the decision process of microunits. For 
example, investment and labor incentives are not only treated as 
a reduction in factor prices, but also as an easy contribution 
to profits. It is important to know to what extent such alter- 
native uses occur. Microstudies have also suggested that firms 
generally do not apply discounted cash flow techniques in 
investment appraisal, so that there seems no reason to measure 
the strength of investment incentives in terms of their 
discounted value. 
5. Certain important relationships will be better under- 
stood with microdata, such as the length of the time lag between 
investment and employment creation. 
6. If microstudies are used to investigate comparative 
costs, performance, and satisfaction of firms after a move to 
development areas, they may yield information on the possible 
resource costs of regional policy. 
However, there are also some serious difficulties with this 
survey research which nay limit its usefulness for impact 
analyses. Some of the difficulties originate from the survey's 
character, others from the particular demands stemming from the 
evaluation purpose. 
1. A major problem can arise in relation to the represen- 
tativeness of the sample. Many microstudies seem to have been 
designed just to collect information for a particular group of 
units, without much attention to the sample selection, 
2. If personal interviews are used it cannot always be 
avoided that the interviewer has some influence on the answers 
of the respondents. 
3. There may be several difficulties with the interpreta- 
tion of the answers given by respondents. First, there may be 
"respondents effects", in the sense that the information given 
by respondents differs from their real behavior. In the case 
of policy questions respondents might say that policy was 
important if this would influence the future availability 
of incentives. Second, the way in which the decision was made 
may be such that it could not easily be incorporated in the 
structure of the questionnaire. Thus, for example, when asked 
to rank relevant factors in order of importance, the interdepen- 
dency of these factors may cause the respondent to opt for one 
main cause when, in fact, a variety of features led to a general 
concensus for a particular decision. ~hird, the problem of 
2s post rationalization permeates survey research. Thus, a 
different rationale may be subse~uently attributed to decisions 
which conceals the real motives in the decision process. Fourth, 
in some microstudies it is impossible to contact the persons who 
took the decision in question. This is especially a problem 
when the time between the decision and the study is such that the 
relevant person is no longer with the firm or the household, 
4. An inherent problem of all survey research is to design 
a questionnaire or interview schedule in such a way as to obtain 
the information required without influencing the answers given by 
the respondents. In policy evaluation it is, for example, 
important to have questions in sufficient detail on the policy 
instruments included in the questionnaire. 
5. As with the controlled experiments, this quasiexperi- 
mental research will reveal only part of the possible impacts, 
i.e., as far as they relate to the respondents participating in 
the survey and to the time period for which the questions have 
been formulated. This also implies that the results will be rather 
specific and not easily generalizable. 
6. It may be difficult to isolate effects of individual 
factors from the information given by the respondents, although 
statistical techniques could be used to solve this problem to 
some extent. 
These difficulties with survey research may make a macro 
approach more attractive in some circumstances. But also 
macrostudies are not without their inherent problems, as will be 
demonstrated below. 
5. MACROSTUDIES WITHOUT AN EXPLICIT MODEL 
Macrostudies use aggregate data to reveal policy impacts, 
and hence only a non- or quasiexperimental approach can be 
followed. In this section we discuss studies that can be 
called nonexperimental since they do not attempt to control for 
the influence of situational variables. In the next two sec- 
tions, studies are discussed in which more serious attempts 
have been undertaken to separate the policy and nonpolicy im- 
pacts, by means of the formulation of some macro model which 
is tested by using certain statistical techniques. The hypoth- 
esized model may be a simple one-equation model (Section 6) or 
a more comprehensive multi-equation model (Section 7). 
The nonexperimental macrostudies are very simple attempts 
to reveal possible policy impacts. The following types of 
studies can be considered as belonging to this category. 
1. Studies which employ a s i m p l e  m o n i t o r i n g  of relevant 
outcomes after policy implementation for the affected regions 
alone, or compared with the situation elsewhere. Policy makers 
frequently use figures on employment estimates by individual 
firms when applying for location aids, partici~ants in certain 
policy programs, and goal variables like unemployment and 
migration to suggest a possible impact of their policies. Of 
course ,  such assessments  have a  very  shaky b a s i s .  This  approach 
i s  more defendable  i f  c e r t a i n  consequences of comprehensive 
p o l i c y  programs have t o  be desc r ibed ,  e.g. ,  t h e  b u i l d i n g  of new 
towns ( s e e  Tuppen, 1979 f o r  an example),  l and  c o l o n i z a t i o n  
schemes ( e .g . ,  Bahrin,  1979) , e t c .  
2 .  S t u d i e s  which under take an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o m p a r i s o n  of 
expe r i ences  w i th  c e r t a i n  p o l i c y  in s t rumen t s ,  by i n v e s t i g a t i n g  
t h e i r  i n t e n s i t y  o f  use and some outcome v a r i a b l e s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  
c o u n t r i e s .  An i n t e r e s t i n g  example i s  a  s tudy  which i n v e s t i g a t e s  
t h e  use  and p o s s i b l e  impacts of r e s t r i c t i v e  p o l i c y  in s t rumen t s  
i n  f o u r  European c o u n t r i e s  (Wettmann, e t  a l . ,  1979) .  Th i s  s tudy  
demonstra tes  t h a t  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  comparison may y i e l d  i n s i g h t  
i n  t h e  working o f  p o l i c y  in s t rumen t s . and  i n  t h e  causes  of a  
v a r i a t i o n  of  t h e i r  impacts among c o u n t r i e s .  
3 .  S t u d i e s  which d e r i v e  by s i m p l e  t i m e  s e r i e s  a n a l y s i s  a  
t r e n d  f o r  t h e  po l icy-of f  o b s e r v a t i o n s ,  and use  t h i s  t o  approxi-  
mate t h e  c o u n t e r f a c t u a l  s i t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  policy-on pe r iod .  The 
gap between t h i s  c o u n t e r f a c t u a l  and t h e  a c t u a l  s i t u a t i o n  i s  
cons idered  a s  a  p o l i c y  impact.  C r u c i a l  t o  t h i s  approach i s  t h e  
c l e a r  a b i l i t y  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between p e r i o d s  of  no ( o r  p a s s i v e )  
a p p l i c a t i o n  of c e r t a i n  ins t ruments  and p e r i o d s  of a c t i v e  po l i cy .  
But i f  such p e r i o d s  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  s h o r t ,  s e r i o u s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
a r i s e  when i n t e r p r e t i n g  them a s  p e r i o d s  i n  which a  smal l  ( p a s s i v e  
phase)  o r  a  l a r g e  ( a c t i v e  phase) p o l i c y  impact can b e  expec ted ,  
because t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  t ime l a g s  may cause  t h e  e f f e c t s  t o  
occur  i n  nonpol icy pe r iods  (compare a l s o  Dessant and Smart,  1977) .  
In  a d d i t i o n ,  one may have r e s e r v a t i o n  i n  e x t r a p o l a t i n g  a  t r e n d  
from a  s h o r t  po l icy-of f  pe r iod  over  a  long policy-on pe r iod  ( a s  
i s  done i n  Rees and M i a l l ,  1979) .  I f  t h e s e  p r o b l e m s d o  n o t  
e x i s t ,  and i f  it can be  shown t h a t  a  d i s t i n c t  gap between t h e  
a c t u a l  and c o u n t e r f a c t u a l  s i t u a t i o n  a r o s e  around t h e  t i m e  of 
p o l i c y  change, some a  p r i o r i  suppor t  f o r  t h e  con ten t ion  t h a t  t h e  
gap i s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  p o l i c y  i s  provided.  The a d d i t i o n  of a  
new p o l i c y  ins t rument  t o  an e x i s t i n g  package would be an example 
where impacts could be r evea l ed  i n  t h i s  way (see Moore and Rhodes, 
1976a) .  
There are several ways in which this approach has been 
operationalized. A first way is to take a simple average policy- 
off value as representing the counterfactual situation. It 
should be noted that, where this approach has been used, the 
estimates thereby derived have been used simply as a check on the 
results of other, more sophisticated, approaches. (Examples can 
be found in Marquand, 1980, for investment trends; in Moore and 
Rhodes, 1976b, and Ashcroft and Taylor, 1977 and 1979, for trends 
in the movement of firms to development areas, in MacKay, 1979, 
for the movement of firms, associated employment, and industrial 
building; and in Martin and Graham, 1980, for trends in personal 
income.) A second way of implementing this approach is to use 
the trend in the regional share of some related variable, to 
estimate the counterfactual values of the impact variable. This 
idea is further developed in Begg, et al. (1976) where the trend 
in the ratio of actual to "standardized" investment is extrap- 
olated from the policy-off period, with standardized investment 
defined as the investment which would have occured had the 
regional share of investment by industry equaled the regional 
share in employment. A third way is to use a regression model 
to fit a trend line through policy-off observations and to project 
this to give the counterfactual situations. In Recker (1977) a 
secular and cyclical time trend is estimated to assess policy 
impacts on employment and investment in German regions. In Frost 
(1975) a regional employment trend is specified by relating 
employment by industry in a certain region to employment in other 
regions, for the policy-off period. 
4. Studies which focus on comparisons across regions to 
estimate the counterfactual situation. Also in this case regional 
shares for other variables have been used to established expected 
nonpolicy values for the impact variables, compare, e.g., Hart 
(1971). 
The basic characteristic of all these studies can be 
described as "measurement without explanation." Since no detailed 
attention is given to the question to what extent other indepen- 
dent variables may have affected the impact variables, the relia- 
bility of the results obtained by such studies is doubtful. More 
sophisticated approaches to the separation of policy and nonpolicy 
influences are therefore required. 
6. WCROSTUDIES WITH A ONE-EQUATION MODEL 
Most macrostudies of regional policy impacts have incorpor- 
ated ideas about the working of the regional economic system, 
to formualte a one-equation model which can be used to estimate 
the impacts. Such a model can then be considered as a kind of 
simple, reduced form model, representing a much more complicated 
structural model which is then, however, not specified. In such 
a reduced form model the policy instruments may or may not be 
explicitly included among the independent variables. This 
distinction is used to put the relevant studies in two different 
groups, to be discussed in 6.1 and 6.2 respectively. Drawbacks 
of the single equation modles will be discussed in 6.3. 
6.1 No Explicit Role for the Policy Instruments 
Studies in this group have in common that attention is 
directed towards modeling the impact of situational variables 
and treating the policy impacts mainly as a residual. This kind 
of approach has been primarily justified by the acknowledgment 
of the serious difficulties associated with deriving aggregate 
measures of policy strength and with incorporating these as 
separate independent variables in statistical analyses (see 6 . 2 ) .  
A first approach which requires explicit discussion is the 
adoption of a deterministic model to account for possible effects 
of the regional economic structure on the overall regional 
development. In a time series context, national sectoral growth 
rates are applied to the regional structure in a certain base 
year, to define the expected counterfactual situation, i.e.: 
where 
h 
Ert  = t h e  expected va lue  of v a r i a b l e  E i n  reg ion  
r ,  y e a r  t 
Eire = t h e  va lue  of v a r i a b l e  E i n  s e c t o r  i i n  
reg ion  r i n  base  yea r  o 
Eit' E i o  = t h e  n a t i o n a l  v a l u e s  of E i n  s e c t o r  i a t  
t i m e s  t and a 
The d ivergence  between a c t u a l  and c o u n t e r f a c t u a l  r e g i o n a l  
A 
development, Ert - E r t ,  w i l l  c o n t a i n  e f f e c t s  of  a  change i n  
economic s t r u c t u r e  between base  and t e r m i n a l  y e a r s ,  and r eg ion  
s p e c i f i c  components i n  s e c t o r a l  growth. Both t y p e s  of  i n f l u e n c e s  
may have been p a r t l y  caused by i n f l u e n c e s  of  po l i cy .  A change i n  
A .. 
t h e  d ivergence  Ert - Ert may i n  c e r t a i n  c i rcumstances  be i n t e r -  
p r e t e d  a s  an i n d i c a t i o n  of p o l i c y  impacts ,  i .e. ,  i f  on ly  r e g i o n a l  
p o l i c y ,  among a l l  t h e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  could have i n f l u e n c e d  perform- 
ance ,  cou ld  have ope ra t ed  i n  a  manner ( i n  t e r m s  of  t iming  and 
d i r e c t i o n )  compat ible  w i th  t h e  observed change. 
Support  f o r  t h e  con ten t ion  t h a t  t h e  above procedure  i d e n t i f i e s  
t h e  p o l i c y  e f f e c t  r e q u i r e s  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  po l i cy -o f f  pe r iod ,  t h e  
h 
divergence  i s  c l o s e  t o  ze ro ,  i . e . ,  Ert - Ert 2 0 ,  and t h a t  it 
i n c r e a s e s  around t h e  t i m e  when p o l i c y  moved i n t o  i t s  a c t i v e  phase,  
t he reby  provid ing  a p r i o r i  suppor t  t h a t  t h e  emergence of  t h e  gap 
between t h e  a c t u a l  and c o u n t e r f a c t u a l  s i t u a t i o n  i s  a t t r i b u t a b l e  
t o  p o l i c y ,  I f  t h e  a c t u a l  and a d j u s t e d  s e r i e s  g e n e r a l l y  do n o t  
c l o s e l y  correspond i n  t h e  po l icy-of f  pe r iod ,  t h e  procedure  adopted 
i s  t h a t  of f i t t i n g  a  t r e n d  l i n e  t o  t h e  d ivergence  i n  t h e  po l icy-of f  
A A 
pe r iod ,  e .g . ,  Ert  - Ert = f  (t) o r  Ert/Ert = g ( t)  , which i s  then  
p r o j e c t e d  i n t o  t h e  policy-on p e r i o d  and added t o  t h e  expected 
A 
s e r i e s  Ert t o  prov ide  an adapted h y p o t h e t i c a l  po l icy-of f  s i t u a t i o n ,  
P A A A .- 
- 
Ert - Ert + f  (t)  o r  crt = Ert g (t)  , w i t h  Ert de f ined  i n  ( 1  ) .  his 
modi f i ca t ion  r e s t s  on t h e  assumption t h a t  t h e  u n s p e c i f i e d  f o r c e s  
o p e r a t i n g  i n  t h e  po l i cy -o f f  p e r i o d  con t inue  t o  a c t  i n  t h e  same 
direction and with the same amplitude as in the policy-on period. 
Another complication arises from the presence of a possible 
cyclical component in yearly observations, which may make the 
detection of structural policy impacts difficult. To eliminate 
such cyclical influences, the terminal year would have to be chosen 
so as to be comparable with the base year in terms of business- 
cycle phase. 
This deterministic decomposition approach sometimes referred 
to as modified shift-share analysis, has found wide application, 
mainly in British studies. Since Moore and Rhodes used this 
method to analyze regional employment in their seminal article 
published in 1973, it has been used in some form by several other 
researchers. Applications to employment data can be found in 
MacKay (1976 and 1979), Moore and Rhodes (1973, 1974, and 1976a), 
Moore, Rhodes, and Tyler (1977), Keeble (1980), and Ohlsson (1980). 
Investment data have been investigated in Ashcroft (1979), Begg, 
et al. (1976), Blake (1976), Moore and Rhodes (1973 and 1974), 
and Rees and Miall (1979), production data in Ohlsson (1980), the 
movement of industrial firms in MacKay ( 1979) . 
The absence of any explicit attention to stochastic elements 
in this deterministic approach has brought some authors to propose 
an alternative, second approach. This is a stochastic standard- 
ization approach, which allows for the possibility to perform 
statistical tests on the significance of estimated impacts. The 
statistical tool is analysis of variance, which has been used in 
Buck and Atkins (1976a). Their model is 
where 
gir = growth of employment in industry i, region 
r, in a certain time period 
Eire = weight of industry i in region r in base 
year o 
The 
= dummy variable with value 1 for industry it 
and 0 in other cases 
= dummy variable with value 1 for region r 
and 0 elsewhere 
u ir = error term 
regional component for region r can be calculated 
EErbr, which may be considered as an indication for a policy 
r 
impact. The advantages ascribed by Buck and Atkins to this 
approach are the possibility of performing statistical tests 
and the feature that the policy effect now exclude3 possible 
stochastic disturbances. However, the approach has also some 
important drawbacks. First, it implies that only a general 
industry-wide regional effect of policy will be identified as a 
policy impact, while any nonsystematic differential growth-- 
which may have a policy causation--is allocated to the residual 
term. Second, a change in economic structure caused by policy 
will not be captured in the impact estimate. 
Users of both standardization approaches have been motiva- 
ted by the desire to use a simple calculation technique, which 
may reveal most of the direct and indirect effects of policy, 
as far as these effects relate to the sectors being investigated. 
There are, however, some problems related to these approaches 
which have to be kept in mind when interpreting their results. 
1. Estimation of the counterfactual situation is done in a 
rather simplified way, by concentrating on one possible 
independent force, i.e., the effect of differences in 
industrial structure. Of course, there are many other 
independent factors which may be of equal or more 
importance (see below). Besides, the use of the same 
standardization techniques in other contexts has 
demonstrated that completely different interpretations 
can be given to the results. 
2. The deterministic approach excludes the possibility 
that regional policy may also effect the national 
aggregates. If such an effect indeed exists (see 
Moore and Rhodes, 1975, for the underlying theoretical 
arguments as to how policy can influence national 
aggregates, and Rees and Miall, 1979, for some evidence) 
the counterfactual situation is inaccurately established. 
3. Since policy instruments play no explicit role in the 
analysis, indications of the reliability with which 
quantitative policy impacts are estimated cannot be 
derived from this kind of work. 
4. Application of these methods to small regions is not 
possible, since the use of national trends to obtain 
the expected series Ert does not make much sense 
(compare Dessant and Smart, 1977). 
5. There are some other drawbacks which are commonly asso- 
ciated with such simple standardization techniques 
(compare Richardson, 1978, and Schofield, 1979). 
A third approach has concentrated on avoiding the drawback. 
mentioned under 1 above, by incorporating several independent 
variables in a regression analysis, while the policy impact is 
still estimated on the basis of the residuals. For example: 
where 
'rt = the dependent, impact variable 
'irt = the ith independent, nonpolicy variable 
Urt = the residual 
An equation such as (3) has been estimated cross sectionally for 
data on industrial employment growth in Dutch regions, in Vanhove 
(1962) (see also Vanhove and Klaassen, 1980) and in Van Duijn 
( 1 9 7 5 ) ,  where the regional values of the unexplained residuals 
are interpreted as indicative for the size of policy impacts. 
Some problems with this approach are apparent: 
1. There is no reason to assume that nonpolicy variables 
have no influence on the size of the residuals. This is 
especially relevant since the studies mentioned above 
incorporated a very small number of independent vari- 
ables with, as a result, a rather low level of overall 
2 
association in terms of R . 
2. If policy instruments, which can a priori be expected to 
directly influence the dependent variable and which are 
likely to be correlated with some of the independent 
variables, are excluded, biased estimates of the 
regression coefficients, and consequently of the policy 
impacts, are obtained. 
3. The average value of regional residuals is by definition 
zero in a cross-section estimation. This implies that 
positive residuals in some regions are offset by negative 
ones in other regions, and that a national effect of 
regional policies can therefore not be detected. It also 
implies that the absolute value of the residuals cannot 
be used to obtain a quantitative estimate of the policy 
impact; only a ranking of the residuals by size may 
reflect the degree of policy success. 
To solve the problems related to these three types of macro- 
studies, an explicit incorporation of policy instruments in the 
model could provide a better alternative. 
6.2 Explicit Incorporation of Policy Instruments 
Models that incorporate both policy instruments and nonpolicy 
variables attempt to present a more complete description of the 
working of the economic system than the type of model discussed in 
6.1. Such a description can in general be obtained in two 
different ways. The first way is to formulate some specific 
behavioral and/or technical hypotheses which are believed to be 
relevant for the part of the system being investigated and to 
derive testable relationships for the impact variable from these 
hypotheses. The second way is to use some ad h o c  reasoning, based 
on intuition and evidence from other empirical studies (e.g., 
microstudies), in the selection of variables and the specification 
of the precise functional relation. The studies to be reviewed 
below belong mainly to the ad hoc type. The preference for such 
an approach, rather than strict theoretical reasoning in a very 
specific framework, is very understandable in this context: 
- the conditions under which most economic theories would 
be applicable are in general difficult to find in the 
real world; 
- there exist no comprehensive theories which reserve a 
specific role for the type of policy interventions 
investigated in the evaluation studies; 
- if possibly relevant theories are formulated for the 
microlevel, application at the macrolevel is not straight- 
forward, because of severe aggregation problems. 
Ad hoc  single equation models have been formulated for 
different types of impact variables (e.g., the deviation series 
h 
Ert - Ert discussed above, industrial moves to assisted areas, 
regional investment and employment growth), and have been 
estimated with cross-section or time-series data, or sometimes 
a combination of both. The best way to make a subdivision is 
to consider the specific way in which the instrument variables 
enter the analysis. 
First, there have been a small number of studies which have 
preferred to use a composCte  Cndex to represent policy influences, 
e.g., a simple dummy variable to represent assisted area status 
or policy-on years (Bartels and Roosma, 1979; and Erfeld, 1979), 
or a weighted average of the strength of different instruments 
(Spanger and Treuner, 1975; and Vanhove and Klaassen, 1980). Of 
course, the latter approach introduces much arbitrariness in the 
specification of the weights. The preference for such a composite 
index is motivated by observations like the following: 
- if the number of instruments that may in principle affect 
the impact variable is very large, it may be intractable 
to separate indicators for each of them; 
- if regional policy works essentially as a package of 
instruments which reinforce each other, an analysis of the 
separate influence of individual instruments makes little 
sense. 
The acceptability of using this composite index approach 
to represent regional policy depends on the extent to which 
the dummy variable incorporates only the availability or non- 
availability of regional incentives and, accordingly, on the 
comprehensiveness of the specification of the nonpolicy component 
of the model. To the extent that other systematic differences 
between nonassisted and assisted areas, or between policy-off and 
policy-on periods, are not explicitly included in the model, 
these will be picked up by the dummy variable which will then 
inaccurately reflect the influence of policy. Furthermore, a 
0/1 dummy variable allows no distinction to be made within the 
assisted areas or within the policy-on period in terms of the 
strength of policy. One can of course attempt to achieve a higher 
degree of differentiation by using values other than 0 or 1, i.e., 
by scori.ng or points system (Bartels and -Roosma, 1979). Again, 
while this may be better than the simple black/white distinction 
made by a 0/1 dummy variable, it is still highly arbitrary. For 
example, to put one value at 0.5 and another at 1.0 implies that 
the latter should have an impulse twice as strong as the former - 
an extremely subjective and ad hoe approach, particularly when 
little justification is given to support the exact magnitude of 
these differences. 
A second t y p e  o f  s t u d y  h a s  i n c o r p o r a t e d  p o l i c y  i n f l u e n c e s  
v i a  a n o t h e r  i n t e r v e n i n g  v a r i a b l e .  P a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  case o f  
i n v e s t m e n t  i n c e n t i v e s  t h i s  approach h a s  been a p p l i e d .  S i n c e  one  
o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  such  i n c e n t i v e s  i s  t o  lower  t h e  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  
one  may d e f i n e :  
where 
c = t h e  u s e r  c o s t  of  c a p i t a l  i n  r e g i o n  r 
r 
c  = t h e  n a t i o n a l  u s e r  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  
P  r = t h e  c o s t  r e d u c i n g  impact  o f  i n c e n t i v e s  
and s u b s e q u e n t l y  i n c o r p o r a t e  v a r i a b l e  cr i n  some r e g i o n a l  
i n v e s t m e n t  model (compare E r f e l d ,  1979, and G r a z i a n i  , 1973) . 
There  are o t h e r  examples which d e m o n s t r a t e  how t h e  u s e  o f  
i n t e r v e n i n g  v a r i a b l e s  may shed some l i g h t  on p o s s i b l e  p o l i c y  
e f f e c t s .  Buck and A t k i n s  (1976b) e s t i m a t e d  e l a s t i c i t i e s  o f  
f a c t o r  s u b s t i t u t i o n  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  s e c t o r s ,  t o  d e r i v e  e x  a n t e  
e s t i m a t e s  o f  p o s s i b l e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  e f f e c t s  caused  by i n c e n t i v e s  
f o r  t h e  u s e  o f  a s p e c i f i c  p r o d u c t i o n  f a c t o r .  Treyz ,  e t  a l .  
(1980) d e r i v e  a reduced-form e q u a t i o n  which c a n  be  used t o  
e s t i m a t e  employment ef fec t s  of changes  i n  c a p i t a l  and l a b o r  
c o s t s ,  caused  by changes  i n  t a x  r a t e s .  (The r e l a t i o n  i s  t h o u g h t  
t o  c a p t u r e  e f f e c t s  o f  f a c t o r  i n t e r m e d i a t e  i n p u t  s u b s t i t u t i o n  and 
o f  s p a t i a l  r e l o c a t i o n . )  
The u s e  o f  i n t e r v e n i n g  v a r i a b l e s  t o  estimate p o l i c y  i m p a c t s  
h a s  a t  leas t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  drawbacks. F i r s t ,  it c o n s t r a i n s  t h e  
mechanism v i a  which p o l i c y  h a s  i t s  e f f e c t s .  To t h e  e x t e n t  
t h a t  i n v e s t m e n t  i n c e n t i v e s  i n f l u e n c e  i n v e s t m e n t  by o t h e r  r o u t e s  
( e . g . ,  v i a  a  l i q u i d i t y  e f f e c t  o r  a l o w e r i n g  o f  p r o d u c t  p r i c e s )  
o r  a r e  s imply  used  as w i n d f a l l  p r o f i t s ,  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  p o l i c y  w i l l  
be inappropriately defined. Second, it assumes that firms (in 
the case of factor incentives) equally perceive, evaluate, and 
react to all variables that affect the intervening variable 
(compare Lund, 1976). Third, if the incentives differ for 
different types of projects it may not be easy to obtain a simple 
aggregate measure of the policy strength [like pr in ( 4 )  1 . 
The third, and most important group of studies is character- 
ized by direct incorporation of separate policy instruments in 
the model. The measurement of the intensity of individual 
instruments has either been done by dummy variables (Ashcroft 
and Taylor, 1979; Erfeld, 1979; MacKay, 1976; Shaffer, 1979) or 
by more detailed indicators. Since we discussed the use of 
dummy variables above, we now concentrate on the more detailed 
indicators for the policy strength. Such indicators have been 
calculated either on a "volume" basis, or on a strength or 
intensity basis. 
"Volume" measures express in some way the size of the program 
implementation and use, for example, total government expendi- 
tures and property taxes per capita (Shaffer, 1979), total 
received assistance for the development of public facilities 
(Martin and Graham, 1980), the size of infrastructural projects 
(Sant, 1975), the size of cumulated social capital stock in 
regions (Mera, 1975), the expenditures on regional incentives 
(~sltin~, 1976; Erfeld, 1979; and Sant, 1975), the number of 
refusals for a development control policy (e.g., Bowers and 
Gunawardena, 1978), the relative number of applicants for 
regional labor market programs (Schmid, 1979), etc. 
The use of such "volume" measures is however dubious for 
policy instruments whose intensity of use depends on the volun- 
tary participation of the relevant decision units. In this 
case the "volume" measure will already incorporate the policy 
impact to some extent. Besides, there will easily be a chance 
of simultaneity bias since the level of the dependent variable 
may codetermine the volume measure. Finally, such volume 
measures may depend on the state of the economy such as in the 
case of investment incentives which are in general applied 
more often in times of high econmic growth. This dependency 
makes the identification of an autonomous policy impact problem- 
atic. 
The alternative to "volume" measures consists of measures 
of the intensity or strength of application of an instrument, 
which do not depend on the use that is made of the instrument. 
For example, the strength of incentive policies is measured by 
estimating their financial significance in reducing factor costs, 
as compared with average factor costs, and the strength of 
disincentive policies is measured in refusal rates, i.e., the 
ratio of refusals to applications. In many studies this kind of 
measurement has in fact.been used; compare, e.g., Ashcroft and 
Taylor, 1977 and 1979; Bowers and Gunawardena, 1978, and Moore 
and Rhodes, 1973 and 1976b. 
Also this approach to measurement has, however, some 
inherent problems. First, there are several reyional policy 
instrurnents whose intensity cannot be easily approximated 
with a simple number, like soft loans, investment allowances, 
or free depreciation. During certain periods such instrument 
have been quite important in regional economic policy. Besides, 
other instrurnents frequently include important elements which 
cannot be easily quantified, such as q u i d  pro quo deals and 
verbal steering in incentive and disincentive policies. Second, 
the need to obtain an aggregate indicator may require specific 
assurnptions which hide important variations in the intensity of 
individual applications and in the ways the instruments may 
enter the decision process. Such variations may arise from the 
award conditions, different rates of incentives for different 
projects, limitations of the coverage of the scheme, the tax 
treatment of received aid, the discounting practices of a firm, 
etc. (A more extensive discussion of such variations can be 
found in Allen, et al., 1979; Melliss and Richardson, 1976; and 
Ohlsson, 1980.) Also the curnulation of incentives for a given 
project may lead to a total award that can be markedly different 
from the sum of the individual awards (see Allen, et al., 1979). 
It will be clear that the required assumptions to obtain an 
aggregate strength measure are frequently rather far-reaching 
and not easily testable (compare Moore and Rhodes, 1973, for 
assumptions used to derive an aggregate incentive indicator). 
A common problem in all studies which directly incorpor- 
ate the separate policy instruments is caused by the fact that 
a relatively complete picture of policy and nonpolicy influences 
implies that a large number of independent variables will have 
to be incorporated in the anlaysis. But frequently the number 
of observations is very limited, and so the researcher has to 
make a selection from the possible independent variables. In 
most British evaluation studies this selection has been very 
limited, incorporating just one or two nonpolicy variables 
(especially the estimation of the influence of the "pressure of 
aggregate demand," measured in different ways, on industrial 
moves and regional development), and a very limited number of 
policy variables (excluding, for example, infrastructural 
investments and the availability of government advance factories). 
A notable exception among British studies is Keeble (1976 and 
1980) where more nonpolicy factors have been included. Also 
studies for some other countries have made more serious attempts 
to incorporate a wider set of nonpolicy influences, e.g., Bartels 
and Roosma (1979), Martin and Graham (1980), Schmid (1979), and 
Shaffer (1979). 
In cases where the nonpolicy situation is represented poorly, 
an overestimation of the policy impact may easily result, because 
of possible multicollinearity between included policy and excluded 
nonpolicy variables. In some studies, where multicollinearity 
contributed to nonsignificant parameter estimates, the collinear 
nonpolicy variables have been omitted, with the possible conse- 
quence that the impact of policy variables becomes significant. 
Typical structural developments of the recent past which have 
harzly been included in the policy studies of regional economic 
development include: 
- Major changes jn the economic structure, with a severe 
decline of employment first in agriculture and mining, 
and later (since the mid sixties) in manufacturing, and 
a fast increase of employment in the service sector; 
- The move of people and jobs from the large conurbations 
to less urbanized areas, a move that has become important 
since the midsixties. According to Keeble (1980) recent 
regional employment trends in Great Britain can be better 
explained by the rurality of regions than by their assisted 
area status (compare also Fothergill and Gudgeon, 1978). 
Since these structural developments have gained in importance 
precisely in a period of more active regional policy making, a 
minimal requirement is that their impacts on regional development 
be separated from the policy impacts. 
6.3 Drawbacks of Single Equation Models 
All approaches discussed in 6.1 and 6.2 employ a single 
equation framework. This restriction may imply a number of 
drawbacks: 
1. In several cases it can be expected that the estimated 
coefficients will possess some simultaneity bias. This may be 
the case for independent nonpolicy variables, which can be 
expected to be influenced by the dependent variable. (Some 
employment studies use regional unemployment as an independent 
location factor, but this variable is clearly codetermined by the 
employment variable.) This may also be the case for the instru- 
ment variables, whose intensity may depend on the value of the 
dependent impact variable. (In cross-section studies a relatively 
poor reqional performance of a variable like employment may 
explain the fact that certain policy instruments are applied in 
such regions. ) 
2. Several policy instruments are intended to influence 
more than one aspect of the regional or national economy, but 
such multiple objectives cannot be accounted for in a single 
equation framework. 
3. Like other approaches discussed so far, this one implies 
that only a partial assessment of policy impacts is possible. 
Indirect effects on other regions, or on other variables, are not 
detected by means of a single-equation model. This drawback may 
be partly solved by applying some ad hoc procedures to the derived 
results, e.g., using multipliers from other sources to calculate 
indirect employment effects. Compare Marquand (1980), Moore and 
Rhodes (1976a) and Ohlsson (1980). 
These drawbacks lead us to the following research method, 
which utilizies a multi-equation framework. 
7 .  MACROSTUDIES WITH A MULTI-EQUATION MODEL 
In multi-equation models several dependent variables are 
related to relevant independent variables, while sometimes simul- 
taneous influences are also accounted for. Such models have been 
constructed for single regions, or for several regions at once 
(a multi-regional model). If interregional linkages are represented 
in the model (an interregional model) interregional policy impacts 
could in principle be estimated. In a top-down multi- or inter- 
regional model (i.e., a model that distributes national totals 
derived from a national model to the different regions) only distri- 
butional impacts of policies can be analyzed, while in a bottom-up 
approach (where national totals are calculated by aggregating 
regional values, which have been determined in the multiregional 
model) also regional policy impacts on national aggregates can be 
estimated in principle. Most operational multiregional models are 
some mixture of a top-down and bottom-up approach, with some 
variables determined primarily at the regional level (population, 
labor force, local services) and others first at the national 
level. 
A relevant distinction in the present context of policy 
evaluation is between econometric and noneconometric models. 
7.1 Econometric Models 
In econometric models the parameters are estimated by 
statistical techniques, using a sufficient amount of data so 
that statistical inferences can be made about the reliability 
of the results. Although a considerable number of regional 
econometric models have been constructed in the recent past, 
few of them seem to have been designed with the principal aim 
of making impact assessments possible. 
Examples of multiregional models especially designed for 
policy evaluation are cross sectionally estimated simple models 
for Austria (Berentsen, 1978) and for the Netherlands (Folmer, 
1980; and Folmer and Oosterhaven, 1981). These studies all 
adopt a multiple objective framework, but are also characterized 
by a poor specification of interrelationship between variables 
and regions. That is, interregional linkages are absent; 
Berentsen incorporates only policy instruments and impact vari- 
ables, but no situational variables; in Folmer (1980) no instru- 
ment variables are explicitly used. An interesting feature of 
the two Dutch studies is that they utilize an estimation technique 
which explicitly allows for measurement errors and unobservable 
variables. An additional interesting characteristic of Folmer 
and Oosterhaven (1981) is the specification of instrument vari- 
ables as endogenous variables in the model. 
Other econometric models for regions have generally paid 
most attention to the specification of relationships between 
dependent and situational variables, with less concern about the 
role of policy intervention in the economic system. Therefore, 
only very particular policy impact analyzes can be made with most 
of these models. Examples of models with the capacity for impact 
assessments can be found in the review papers of Bolton (1 980) 
and Glickman (1980a) (see also Adams and Glickman, 1980; Glickman, 
1980b; and van Delft et al., 1977). An especially ambitious 
model is the 51 regions bottom-up model developed at the U.S. 
Department of Commerce (compare Ballard and Wendling, 1980) 
which has been used for several types of e x  a n t e  policy impact 
analysis (compare Ballard et al. 1980). 
7.2 Noneconometric Models 
There exists also a group of models, consisting of relation- 
ships which have not been quantified by means of conventional 
statistical techniques. Instead point estimates are used for 
all or some of the coefficients, or a mixture of different 
estimation models is used for quantification of the relations. 
Such models have generally been designed to make rather detailed 
simulations of economic systems possible, a purpose which has 
made a full econometric estimation of the model impossible. 
Input-output models. can be considered as f.irst examples of this 
group, since they have generally been based on point estimates of 
input-output coefficients and other relevant coefficients. 
Regional input-output models have the capacity of estimating also 
some indirect effects of certain exogenous changes, through 
interindustry linkages, induced consumption (if consumption is 
endogenous), or induced investment (if investment is endogenous), 
while in interregional input-output models, which incorporate 
interregional interindustry linkages, also some interregional 
effects can be traced. Since input-output models are essentially 
demand driven, a requirement for policy impact assessment is that 
the policies can be translated into changes in the final demand 
categories, e.g., in government expenditures. A large number of 
studies have exploited this feature for both e x  p o s t  and e x  a n t e  
estimation of policy impacts, mainly o f  changes in government 
expenditures in regions. (Recent examples are Oakland, 1979, and 
Oosterhaven, 1981; in Moore and Rhodes, 1976a, input-output models 
have been used to calculate impacts of labor subsidies via their 
effect on prices of final demand categories.) 
A second group is formed by the so-called microsimulation 
models. Such models have been designed to simulate e x  a n t e  
effects of policy changes on data bases containing observations 
on disaggregated components of one or more major sectors of the 
economy. The disaggregated feature makes them especially attrac- 
tive for the analysis of distributional impacts (i.e., on certain 
groups of people) of policy changes. The advantages which are 
generally ascribed to microsimulation models include: available 
detailed information about the initial state of the microunits 
can be fully used; regulations relating to microunits can be 
given a literal representation; available understanding about the 
behavior of microunits can be used; assumptions about microunits 
can be introduced at the microlevel; outputs can be aggregated as 
desired (see Orcutt, et al. 1980); they can give answers to 
questions at the microlevel; and the use of disaggregated rela- 
tions may be more accurate than that of aggregated relations 
because the latter conceal distributional assumptions of some 
kind (Arrow, 1980). 
In most applications of microsimulation models the behavior 
of households is analyzed in the most detailed way (compare several 
contributions in Haveman and Hollenbeck, 1980), while enterprises 
and government are treated at a more general level. (For an 
attempt to analyze the behavior of firms in a more detailed way 
see however Eliasson, 1980.) Treatment of some variables at an 
aggregated level requires the addition of a macroblock to the 
detailed microblock. 
Microsimulation models have been used for the e x  cnte 
assessment of spatial impacts of certain national policies; compare 
some of the contributions in Haveman and Hollenbeck (1980) and 
also Danziger, et al. (1980). 
7.3 Some Weak Points in Multi-equation Models 
Although the use of a multi-equation framework offers in 
principle an attractive point of departure to obtain quantitative 
estimates of policy impacts, most operational models have their 
weaknesses, which restrict the reliability of their results. 
These weak points relate mainly to the specification of the models. 
First, many models are to an important extent demand driven, 
and do not allow the possibility of capacity constraints, which 
in reality may be very important. (In Oakland, 1979, it is 
demonstrated how the incorporation of such constraints affects 
the impact estimates.) Second, interregional linkages are mostly 
incorporated in a rather poor way, e.g., by means of crude inter- 
action variabls which are assumed to represent such linkages. 
(The basic problem is, of course, the absence of statistics on 
interregional trade.) Third, as was noted already, the policy 
component of the models is in general very poorly specified, with 
few serious attempts to incorporate the most relevant policy 
instruments. Fourth, most models have used a very traditional 
theoretical framework with few attempts to adjust "national" 
theories to the particularities of the regional economy. (For 
example, a disequilibrium approach seems to be very obvious in 
many cases, but it has hardly been used in regional model building.) 
There are still some other problems, which we prefer to 
discuss in a separate section, however, since they apply also to 
the single equation studies. 
8. WEAK POINTS IN THE MACRO APPROACH 
Several researchers have used some sort of macro approach to 
obtain quantitative estimates of direct and indirect policy impacts. 
Especially British researchers have shown much enthusiasm for the 
single-equation approach. Their applications have even produced a 
controversy about what the exact figure of employment impacts of 
regional economic policy has been (for a summary of different 
quantitative estimates, see Ashcroft, 1979). It is, however, 
difficult to take such discussions seriously, since there are 
several weak points (apart from those already mentioned above) in 
the macro approach, which make such exact interpretations of the 
results a bit ridiculous. In this section we want to discuss some 
obvious problems which arise in most macrostudies. 
A first problem is caused by the quasiexperimental nature of 
the research. Of crucial importance in such research is the 
specification of the policy-off situation which requires that all 
r e l e v a n t  nonpol icy f a c t o r s  have been inc luded .  But t h e  problem 
common t o  a l l  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  r e s e a r c h  i s  t h a t  one never  knows 
f o r  s u r e  whether a l l  o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  inc luded  (see 
a l s o  Cook and S c i o l i ,  1975) .  There fore ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  much room 
f o r  pe r sona l  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  which w i l l  a f f e c t  t h e  r e s u l t s .  More 
s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  i n  many s t u d i e s  of r e g i o n a l  employment and indus- 
t r i a l  movement, it i s  o f t e n  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  t h e  r e a d e r  t o  f i n d  t h e  
r a t i o n a l e  behind t h e  cho ice  o f  exp lana to ry  v a r i a b l e s .  S t u d i e s  
on i n d u s t r i a l  movement, f o r  example, a r e  n o t  based on any e x p l i c i t  
t h e o r y  of  t h e  f i r m  o r  on p rev ious  r e s u l t s  from mic ros tud i e s .  
(Micros tud ies  would sugges t  t h e  importance o f  i n t e r n a l  a s p e c t s  o f  
t h e  f i r m  and t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of sites and premises  f o r  l o c a t i o n ,  
b u t  bo th  f a c t o r s  a r e  a b s e n t  i n  most macros tud ies . )  
A second g e n e r a l  problem r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  c h o i c e  of p r o x i e s  
and m e a s u r e ~ e n t s  f o r  t h e  v a r i a b l e s .  W e  mentioned a l r e a d y  t h e  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  which a r i s e  w i t h  t h e  measurement o f  i n s t rumen t  and 
impact v a r i a b l e s .  B u t . a l s o  t h e  measurement of t h e  nonpol icy  
independent  v a r i a b l e s  may have an impor tan t  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  
de r ived  r e s u l t s .  I n  B r i t a i n ,  f o r  example, t h e r e  has  been a  
con t rove r sy  about  which p r e s s u r e  of  demand proxy t o  use  i n  
movement models. S ince  t h i s  v a r i a b l e  was t h e  o n l y  nonpol icy 
v a r i a b l e  i n  such s t u d i e s  a s  Bowers and Gunawardena (1979) ,  and 
Moore and Rhodes (1976b) ,  t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s u l t s  appeared t o  
be  very  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  proxy used. S i m i l a r  problems 
have a r i s e n  w i t h  t h e  p r o x i e s  f o r  nonpol icy  l o c a t i o n  f a c t o r s .  For 
example, how do w e  measure t h e  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  r e g i o n a l  
l a b o r  market? Should t h i s  be measured by t h e  r e l a t i v e  r e g i o n a l  
unemployment r a t e ,  by t h e  d e v i a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e g i o n a l  from t h e  
n a t i o n a l  unemployment r a t e ,  o r  by means of  a  more comprehensive 
i n d i c a t o r  which a l s o  accoun t s  f o r  i n f l u e n c e s  on l a b o r  supply  from 
i n t e r s e c t o r a l  s h i f t s  i n  employment, n a t u r a l  popu la t i on  growth, and 
autonomous i n t e r r e g i o n a l  migra t ion?  
A t h i r d  problem, which a r i s e s  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  employment 
r e l a t i o n s ,  i s  caused by t h e  complicated t i m e  l a g s  which may 
e x i s t  between t h e  implementat ion of  an  i n s t rumen t  and t h e  d a t i n g  
of t h e  impact.  Such l a g s  may be c o n s i d e r a b l e ,  f o r  i n s t rumen t s  
l i k e  investment  i n c e n t i v e s  and i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  p rov i s ion .  Some 
kind of d i s t r i b u t e d  l a g  s t r u c t u r e  could perhaps  c a p t u r e  t h i s  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  i n  t h e  model, b u t  t h e  p r e s e n t  e v a l u a t i o n  s t u d i e s  
do n o t  u t i l i z e  such a s t r u c t u r e .  The problem becomes s t i l l  more 
complicated i f  it can reasonably  be assumed t h a t  t h e  l a g  d i s t r i -  
bu t ion  v a r i e s  both  c y c l i c a l l y  and s e c u l a r l y  ove r  t i m e  (compare 
Lund, 1976) .  I t  i s  h a r d l y  p o s s i b l e  t o  t r a n s l a t e  t h i s  i n t o  an 
o p e r a t i o n a l  model, and it is  n o t  very clear how t h e  r e s u l t s  may 
be a f f e c t e d  by t h e  r e s u l t i n g  m i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  model. 
A f o u r t h  problem i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  assumption t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  
exp lana to ry  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  independent  of  each o t h e r ,  and t h a t  
t hey  have a  p r o p o r t i o n a l  impact  on t h e  dependent v a r i a b l e .  This  
assumption i s  ve ry  common i n  t h e s e  e v a l u a t i o n  s t u d i e s .  I n  many 
c a s e s ,  however, it i s  c l e a r  on a p r i o r i  grounds t h a t  such an 
assumption i s  u n r e a l i s t i c .  For example, it i s  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  
t h e  pursuance o f  r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s  and t h e  s ta te  of  
t h e  r e g i o n a l  and/or n a t i o n a l  economy w i l l  be independent  (compare 
a l s o  Nico l ,  1979);  o r  t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t s  of  i n c e n t i v e s  and d i s i n -  
c e n t i v e s  a r e  l a r g e l y  independent of each o t h e r ,  o r  t h a t  i n v e s t -  
ment i n c e n t i v e s  w i l l  have a  p r o p o r t i o n a l  impact  on r e g i o n a l  
investment .  A s  long a s  such p o s s i b i l i t i e s  a r e  n o t  t aken  i n t o  
account  i n  t h e  model s p e c i f i c a t i o n ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  may be complete ly  
i n i s in t e rp re t ed .  
A f i f t h  problem which i s  i n h e r e n t  t o  r e g r e s s i o n  a n a l y s i s  is  
t h e  r e q u i r e d  assumption of c o n s t a n t  c o e f f i c i e n t s  ove r  r e l a t i v e l y  
long p e r i o d s  of  t i m e  ( i n  t i m e  s e r i e s  a n a l y s i s )  o r  ove r  a  r e l a t i v e l y  
l a r g e  set  of d i f f e r e n t  r e g i o n s  ( i n  c r o s s - s e c t i o n  a n a l y s i s ) .  I n  
many a p p l i c a t i o n s  t h i s  assumption seems t o  be  ha rd ly  defendable ,  
however. Nonpolicy v a r i a b l e s  may have an impact  which d i f f e r s  i n  
time ( e .g . ,  t h e  e f f e c t  of r e g i o n a l  l a b o r  supply a s  a  l o c a t i o n  
f a c t o r  i s  codetermined by t h e  g e n e r a l  l a b o r  market  s i t u a t i o n )  o r  
ove r  r eg ions .  The same may be  t r u e  f o r  t h e  impact  of  i n s t rumen t  
v a r i a b l e s .  I n  S h a f f e r  (1979) it was demonstra ted t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t s  
of a  c r o s s - s e c t i o n  a n a l y s i s  d i f f e r e d  a l r e a d y  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  sub- 
p e r i o d s  w i t h i n  a  t ime  span of 10 y e a r s .  I n  Suyker (1980) it was 
shown how, among other things, the impact of housing supply on 
net regional migration changes over time, while Suyker (1979) 
presents evidence for a time dependent impact coefficient for 
investment incentives in a regional industrial employment model 
(by making the impact dependent on the national growth of indus- 
trial employment). 
A sixth problem which is typical for the evaluation studies 
is that the presented information makes it rather difficult to 
adequately judge the precise statistical properties of the 
estimations. They present very few test statistics for judging 
to what extent the statistical assumptions underlying the estima- 
tion are indeed met and hardly any sensitivity tests (to investi- 
gate the effects of small changes in the data or removal of out- 
layers for example). The problem is particularly severe with the 
large scale econometric regional models. Since they are so large, 
it is simply impossible to present all relevant statistical 
information. But the consequence is that it is also impossible 
for an outsider to make any reliable judgement about the quality 
of such models (see Arrow, 1980, for similar complaints). 
A final problem with present studies relates to the uncertainty 
of the impact estimates. Adopting a stochastic framework, as has 
been done in most studies, implies that one can never tell with 
complete certainty what will be the impact of a certain explanatory 
variable. The only assessment that can be made is that under a 
large number of assumptions an-interval can be specified in which 
with certain reliability the impact estimate may be located. It 
is rather curious to note that none of the evaluation studies 
demonstrates full awareness of the stochastic nature of the results 
obtained. All put strong reliance on the interpretation of point 
estimates, and no attempts are made to present interval estimates. 
This drawback is, however, not particular to the studies reviewed 
in this paper; it also applies to most other evaluation studies in 
economics (see Arrow, 1980, for additional comments). Yet, the 
drawback may be rather simply solved especially in linear models 
(whereas for nonlinear multi-equation models, where formulas for 
asymptotic variances of impact multipliers are not known, stoch- 
astic simulation could be used to perform sensitivity analysis, 
compare Fair, 1980). Unreliability of coefficient estimates is, 
however, not the only source of uncertainty in the impact estimates. 
For example, one knows for sure that the model will not completely 
represent the real world (especially in cases where important 
changes in policy are investigated, which may be expected to 
affect also the structural relationships themselves), and in 
ex ante analyzes the values of other exogeneous variables will be 
unknown, All these sources of uncertainty require careful 
sensitivity studies to investigate how they might affect the 
results. 
9. HEROIC ATTEMPTS TOWARDS MORE COMPREHENSIVE COST-BENEFIT 
EVALUATION 
The foregoing paragraphs have reviewed studies which could be 
characterized as partial assessments of policy impacts. None of 
these studies intended to derive a more or less complete picture 
of different advantages and disadvantages of certain policies from 
a certain point of view. Given the many difficulties one has 
already to solve for making reliable partial impact assessments, 
it is obvious that attempts to assess the costs and benefits in a 
more comprehensive way still require a larger number of often 
heroic assumptions, Results of such studies are consequently 
easily disputed. It is not our intention to present extensive 
criticism here; instead we shall briefly mention some studies 
which contain interesting approaches. 
A first type of cost-benefit analysis may be undertaken from 
the point of view of the Treasury, to investigate if the policy 
implies on the whole a real cost for the state. Such an analysis 
has to estimate different kinds of costs and benefits for the 
Treasury in financial terms. Benefits may include payments on 
recoverable items (like loans), increases in tax payments from 
assisted firms and newly employed workers, increases in national 
insurance contributions, savings in unemployment and other social 
security payments, savings in infrastructure because of a more 
f a v o r a b l e  p o p u l a t i o n  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  C o s t s  may i n c l u d e  non- 
r e c o v e r a b l e  o u t l a y  i t e m s  ( g r a n t s ) ,  i n c r e a s e s  i n  i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  f o r  f i r m s  o r  househo lds ,  t h e  a d m i n s t r a t i v e  c o s t s  o f  
p o l i c y  making, and p o s s i b l e  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t s  (more unemployment 
b e n e f i t s ,  less t a x  payments) caused  by p o s s i b l e  n e g a t i v e  i n d i r e c t  
e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  p o l i c y .  I n  a d d i t i o n  it h a s  been a r g u e d  t h a t  a l s o  
consequences  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  n a t i o n a l  economic p o l i c y ,  t o  m a i n t a i n  
a g g r e g a t e  demand i n  p r o s p e r o u s  r e g i o n s ,  have  t o  b e  added (Moore 
and Rhodes, 1974, 1975, and 1977; see however, S c h o f i e l d ,  1979, 
f o r  c r i t i c i s m ) .  I t  seems t h a t  t h i s  k i n d  o f  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  
w i l l  y i e l d  t h e  most  r e l i a b l e  r e s u l t s  when made f o r  v e r y  s p e c i f i c  
p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s ,  i n s t e a d  o f  comple te  p o l i c y  packages .  (Examples 
o f  such  a p p l i c a t i o n s  a r e  Schmid, 1979, where an  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  
r e g i o n a l  wage-cost  s u b s i d i e s  i n  Germany is  p r e s e n t e d ,  and Calame, 
1980, which c o n t a i n s  r e s u l t s  of e v a l u a t i o n  s t u d i e s  f o r  wage 
s u b s i d i e s  i n  a  number o f  c o u n t r i e s . )  
A second t y p e  o f  more comprehensive e v a l u a t i o n  a t t e m p t s  t o  
q u a n t i f y  a d v a n t a g e s  and d i s a d v a n t a g e s  f o r  t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy.  
I t  i s  n o t  a  p r i o r i  clear  on what v a r i a b l e  such  a s s e s s m e n t  would 
have  t o  c o n c e n t r a t e ;  a p a r t  from economic v a r i a b l e s  such  a s  unem- 
ployment and n a t i o n a l  income, o t h e r  v a l i d  i n d i c a t o r s  would be  t h e  
d e g r e e  o f  o v e r a l l  c o n g e s t i o n  and t h e  w e l l  b e i n g  o f  p e o p l e  d e r i v e d  
from t h e i r  p l a c e s  o f  l i v i n g .  I f  w e  res t r ic t  o u r s e l v e s  t o  t h e  
economic i m p a c t s ,  w e  c a n  i n d i c a t e  some o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  on  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  economy. P o s s i b l e  advan tages  of r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y  c o u l d  
i n c l u d e  t h e  u s e  of  r e s o u r c e s  which would o t h e r w i s e  have  remained 
i d l e  ( e s p e c i a l l y  l a b o r ) ,  a  d e c r e a s e  i n  i n f l a t i o n ,  e f f e c t s  o f  
n a t i o n a l  p o l i c i e s  implemented t o  a f f e c t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  of  p r o s p e r -  
o u s  r e g i o n s .  [ I n  t h e  Moore and Rhodes (1975) approach  t h e  assump- 
t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  s t r a t e g y  d e t e r m i n e s  which p a r t  of  
c r e a t e d  j o b s  c a n  be c o n s i d e r e d  a s  n e t  c r e a t i o n  i n s t e a d  o f  s i m p l e  
d i v e r s i o n  from t h e  p r o s p e r o u s  r e g i o n s . ]  p o s s i b l e  d i s a d v a n t a g e s  
c o u l d  i n c l u d e  t h e  c o s t s  o f  moving f i r m s  t o  o t h e r  l o c a t i o n s ,  
h i g h e r  p r o d u c t i o n  c o s t s  i n  a s s i s t e d  a r e a s ,  p r o d u c t i v i t y  l o s s e s  
from more l a b o r  i n t e n s i v e  p r o d u c t i o n ,  l o s t  o u t p u t  r e s u l t i n g  from 
d i s i n c e n t i v e  i n s t r u m e n t s ,  e x t r a  c o s t s  caused  by a d d i t i o n a l  i n f r a -  
s t r u c t u r e ,  etc .  S e r i o u s  work t o  e x p l o r e  t h e  c o m p l i c a t e d  q u e s t i o n s  
which arise in such evaluation has been done by Blake (1973) but 
especially by Moore and Rhodes (1974, 1975, and 1977). (For a 
critical discussion of their assumptions compare Ashcroft, 1979; 
Marquand, 1980; and Schofield, 1979.) 
A third type of comprehensive evaluation is concerned with 
the o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s  of the policy strategy actually used. The 
basic question is: What would have been the implications of 
alternative uses of the expenditures devoted to regional assis- 
tance, e.g., on the use of national resources? To answer this 
question one needs an assumption concerning what kind of restric- 
tions on the national economy could have been removed by means of 
the released financial means and some kind of model of the 
national economy which makes e x  a n t e  assessment of alternative 
policies possible. A good discussion of the difficulties which 
have to be solved with this approach is given in Marquand (1980). 
This brief discussion of the more ambitious comprehensive 
evaluation studies demonstrates that a complete assessment of 
costs and benefits of one or alternative policy strategies can 
be considered as being beyond the capability of objective 
research. There are so many disputable assumptions to be made, 
that unequivocal conclusions are impossible. 
10. HOW TO PROCEED 
A reader impressed by all the difficulties associated with 
quantitative assessments of policy impacts could be inclined to 
conclude that a serious scientific approach to this particular 
problem is not very well practicable; and that therefore, this 
field of study is not a very fruitful one for further development, 
However, the role of government in economic life has become so 
important, that it is simply impossible to deny its impacts on 
economic development, Policy makers themselves have already 
created an increased demand for studies that- assess impacts of 
different policy actions. (This is, for example, demonstrated by 
the trend towards urban impact analysis in the USA, see Glickman, 
1980b,) Therefore, it makes sense to conclude this discussion 
with a brief answer to the question: How do we proceed? 
An obvious  f i r s t  d e s i r e  f o r  f u t u r e  r e s e a r c h  on t h i s  t o p i c ,  
i s  t h a t  t h e  p o s s i b l e  drawbacks r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  method- 
o logy  adop ted  a r e  minimized as much as p o s s i b l e ,  and t h a t  c a r e -  
f u l  s e n s i t i v i t y  a n a l y z e s  would be  made o f  t h e  p o s s i b l e  e f f e c t s  o f  
r emain ing  d e f i c i e n c i e s .  With r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  o f  
t h e  d i f f e r e n t  methods,  it i s  o u r  o p i n i o n  t h a t  v a l u a b l e  r e s u l t s  
c o u l d  be o b t a i n e d  from t h e  e x p e r i m e n t a l  approach t o  m i c r o s t u d i e s  
which c o u l d  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  a  b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  working 
o f  v e r y  s p e c i f i c  programs (see a l s o  Marquand, 1980, f o r  p l e a s  
i n t o  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n ) ,  and from t h e  f u r t h e r  development  of  m u l t i -  
e q u a t i o n  models ,  i n t o  a d i r e c t i o n  which would p r o v i d e  i n s i g h t  
i n t o  e f f e c t s  of  i n s t r u m e n t  v a r i a b l e s  on t h e  u l t i m a t e  g o a l  v a r i a -  
b l e s  o f  r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y  ( such  as unemployment, a c t i v i t y  r a t e s ,  
i n t e r r e g i o n a l  m i g r a t i o n ,  and even s e l f  s u s t a i n e d  economic growth 
o f  r e g i o n s ) .  Such models c o u l d  a l s o  b e  h e l p f u l  as t o o l s  f o r  
ex a n t e  impac t  a n a l y s i s ,  which i s  a n o t h e r  a r e a  where more f u t u r e  
r e s e a r c h  would b e  welcome. 
I t  h a s  a l r e a d y  been demons t ra ted  (Marquand, 1980; and Moore 
and Rhodes, 1976a and 1977) t h a t  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  impac t  
e s t i m a t e s  can be much improved, when r e s u l t s  o f  micro-  and macro- 
s t u d i e s  are compared, t o  d e t e c t  t o  what e x t e n t  t h e s e  p o i n t  i n  t h e  
same d i r e c t i o n .  Ex p o s t  e v a l u a t i o n  s t u d i e s  s h o u l d  a d o p t  t h i s  
approach more f r e q u e n t l y .  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  a r e  two s p e c i f i c  t o p i c s  which s e e m  t o  r e q u i r e  
more a t t e n t i o n  i n  f u t u r e  e v a l u a t i o n  s t u d i e s .  The f i r s t  i s  t h e  
r o l e  of  i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l  i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  r e g i o n a l  economic develop-  
ment. T h i s  r o l e  h a s  h a r d l y  been i n v e s t i g a t e d  e m p i r i c a l l y  up u n t i l  
now (compare also Nijkamp and S i g a r ,  1980) .  The second is  t h e  r o l e  
of  long- term t r e n d s  i n  economic l i f e  i n  r e g i o n a l  economic 
development .  The p r o s p e r o u s  phase  i n  t h e  l o n g  c y c l e  h a s  been 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a  r e l a t i v e l y  f a s t  expans ion  o f  b u s i n e s s  a c t i v i t y ,  
l o o k i n g  a l s o  f o r  new l o c a t i o n s  i n  p e r i p h e r a l  a r e a s ,  and by t h e  
i n c r e a s e  i n  a v a i l a b l e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  t o  i n t e n s i f y  r e g i o n a l  
economic p o l i c y .  The i n t r i g u i n g  q u e s t i o n  o f  which o f  t h e s e  two 
f a c t o r s  h a s  c o n t r i b u t e d  most of  a l l  t o  t h e  o c c a s i o n a l l y  obse rved  
improvement i n  t h e  performance  of  t h e  development  areas h a s  n o t  
y e t  been s u f f i c i e n t l y  answered.  
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